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The Trump administration’s attempts to use Europe’s military and technological dependence on the United States as leverage could backfire, accelerating European strategic autonomy and turning the continent into a more powerful independent force, according to The Times.
The newspaper describes the situation as a “bitter paradox”: Washington is increasingly exploiting Ukraine’s and Europe’s reliance on US air defense systems, satellite communications and intelligence, but this pressure is pushing European countries to urgently develop their own alternatives.
“The upside is that Washington’s attempts to exert pressure are creating the European autonomy that many believed would never emerge,” the authors write.
They argue that if European countries withstand Russian pressure over the next 18 months and avoid political destabilization, the continent could emerge from the current crisis as a “much more formidable force.”
Europe recognizes the cost of dependence on the US
Europe can now replace most of the US financial assistance to Ukraine and a substantial share of its weapons supplies. However, critical dependencies remain, including Patriot interceptor missiles, satellite-based early-warning systems for ballistic missile launches and communications networks comparable to Starlink.
The authors attribute these vulnerabilities to roughly three decades of excessive European reliance on American military superiority.
That dependence is beginning to change. European countries are accelerating the development of their own missile defense capabilities, ordering new SAMP/T NG systems, pursuing the multinational FREYJA program and seeking additional sources of interceptor missiles, including Japan.
Every euro Europe invests in its own weapons systems is money that will no longer go to American defense contractors — and another capability that the US president will be unable to delay supplying.
Europe develops alternatives to US satellite systems
European radar and optical satellites could potentially replace a significant portion of American intelligence capabilities relatively quickly.
OneWeb and Europe’s GovSatcom system can already provide partial alternatives to Starlink for Europe and Ukraine. However, according to the authors, a fully independent European system capable of detecting ballistic missile launches is unlikely to be operational before the 2030s.
These technological gaps remain Washington’s most significant sources of leverage.
Until American technologies can be replaced, Europe can draw on its economic and financial strength to support Ukraine.
A €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine, along with approximately €202 billion in frozen Russian assets, could provide major resources for continued assistance to Kyiv.
Other potential measures include a complete ban on European services used to transport Russian oil and intensified efforts to combat Russia’s shadow fleet. These steps could further undermine Moscow’s ability to finance the war without imposing substantial additional costs on European taxpayers.
Ukraine could strengthen Europe’s defense industry
Ukraine’s defense industry could become another pillar of Europe’s future independence from the United States. Ukrainian drone production has increased by 370% this year, according to the article.
Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missiles cost less than $600,000 each, compared with approximately $3.5 million for an American Tomahawk missile.
Denmark has already provided a state-backed loan guarantee to the manufacturer of the Flamingo missile.
The authors describe a model combining European capital with Ukrainian technology and weapons production as a potential formula for resilience amid unpredictable US policy.
Washington risks exhausting its leverage
Political pressure works only until the targeted party develops alternatives. The Trump administration has demonstrated to Ukraine and Europe how unreliable American guarantees can become when Washington’s political direction changes.
Examples include delays in US air defense deliveries, problems involving Starshield and White House decisions to ease economic pressure on Moscow. Such moves are pushing Kyiv and European capitals to develop systems that no longer depend on the US president’s decisions.
As a result, Washington’s attempts to use its military and technological superiority as a tool of coercion could gradually diminish the value of that leverage.
“Since the time of Charlemagne, Europe has had no better unifier than Donald Trump,” the article says.
Europe, Ukraine and other US partners have already seen the potential cost of American guarantees when Washington changes course.
Now the United States may have to confront the other side of that process: political influence, like interceptor missile stocks, is finite. Every time it is used, it gradually loses some of its power.
