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European allies are increasingly questioning South Korea’s reliability as a partner as Seoul gradually restores political and economic contacts with Russia despite its war against Ukraine and growing military cooperation between Moscow and North Korea, the Financial Times reported.
Recently, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung warmly welcomed the crew of the container ship PanStar Acro after its voyage through the Arctic, pledging to “respond with unwavering action and open a new path for the Republic of Korea.”
The Northern Sea Route runs along Russia’s Arctic coast and can shorten travel to Europe by 10 days compared with the route through the Suez Canal. However, using it requires extensive cooperation with Moscow.
European diplomats in Seoul view the voyage as a diplomatic and commercial step toward Russia, even as the Kremlin deepens its partnership with North Korea and continues its war against Ukraine.
Concerns have also grown following reports that South Korea shipped more than 176,000 tonnes of fuel, mostly diesel, to Russia in July and August aboard tankers subject to UK and EU sanctions.
These developments have prompted some European diplomats to question whether South Korea remains a reliable partner. They had previously regarded the country as a like-minded democracy with shared economic and security interests.
“[South Korea] is not really a ‘like-minded’ partner. The bet is that the war [in Ukraine] will not last forever, and they want to return to business with Russia as soon as it ends,” one European diplomat in Seoul said.
The FT noted that European concerns about South Korea’s approach to Russia predate Lee’s presidency. Seoul’s lax enforcement of export controls on computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools, which can be used to manufacture ammunition, has been a particular source of concern.
In February 2025, two South Korean executives were convicted of illegally exporting CNC machine tools to Russia. They received suspended one-year prison sentences, while their company was fined just $30,000.
Some FT sources say these concerns have intensified under Lee.
In November 2025, the Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS), which is linked to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, held a closed-door conference with the Russian International Affairs Council. According to the Russian council’s website, the meeting aimed to explore opportunities for political dialogue and “prospects for expanding economic cooperation.”
In June, INSS President Kim Sung-bae visited Moscow for a closed-door strategic dialogue with Russian counterparts.
Lee recently appointed former Democratic Party leader Song Young-gil as a special adviser on peace diplomacy. Song, who also served as a presidential envoy to Russia, has long advocated closer ties with Moscow. In 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded him the Order of Friendship at the Kremlin.
Mason Richey, a professor of international politics at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, said officials such as national security adviser Wi Sung-lac and people close to Foreign Minister Cho Hyun appeared to be losing influence over Lee, while figures such as Song seemed to have the president’s ear.
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko said this month that Moscow had received statements from South Korean officials expressing their ambitions to normalize relations after the war in Ukraine ends.
In a response to the FT, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry rejected claims that the country was leaning too far toward Russia.
“Concerns in some quarters that South Korea is leaning too far toward Russia do not correspond to the facts,” the ministry said.
“As a responsible member of the international community, the South Korean government supports and participates in global efforts to end the war in Ukraine and restore peace,” it added.
Meanwhile, relations between Seoul and Kyiv have deteriorated significantly following a dispute last month over the disclosure of information about the transfer of two North Korean prisoners of war to South Korea.
Lee accused Kyiv of violating a confidentiality agreement and demanded an apology. The South Korean government subsequently recalled its ambassador and several diplomats from Ukraine.
Kim Saeme of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies cautioned against overstating claims that South Korea was shifting toward Russia. She argued that Lee’s administration had moved away from what was known as “values-based diplomacy” toward a more pragmatic, interest-driven approach.
She added that Seoul’s policy toward Moscow reflects a longstanding view of Russia as a powerful neighbor that South Korea cannot afford to ignore or provoke.
“South Korea’s foreign policy has historically been framed around the ‘four major powers’: the United States, China, Japan and Russia,” she said.
However, Kim questioned whether this traditional framework remained relevant, arguing that modern relations with Moscow “must begin with the recognition that Russia is helping strengthen North Korea’s military capabilities, increasing the security threat to South Korea itself.”
Ramon Pacheco Pardo of King’s College London noted that Europe itself lacks a unified position on Russia.
Europe’s influence over South Korean policy is also limited by the growing importance of the country’s defense industry, which has helped replenish European weapons stocks after arms were sent to Ukraine.
Former Ukrainian ambassador Valerii Chalyi has argued that the current dispute between Kyiv and Seoul also exposes a deeper problem: weakened communication within Ukraine’s own foreign policy system. He said both sides urgently need diplomatic crisis management and efforts to rebuild trust, warning that otherwise potential areas of cooperation between the two countries could be put on hold for a long time.
